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Jewish Terrorists Assassinate U.N. Peacekeeper Count Folke Bernadotte 
By Donald Neff 
It was 47 years ago, Sept. 17, 1948, when Jewish terrorists assassinated Count Folke Bernadotte of 
Sweden as he sought to bring peace to the Middle East. His three-car convoy had been stopped at a 
small improvised roadblock in Jewish-controlled West Jerusalem when two gunmen began shooting 
out the tires of the cars and a third gunman thrust a Schmeisser automatic pistol through the open back 
window of Bernadotte's Chrysler. The 54-year-old diplomat, sitting on the right in the back, was hit by 
six bullets and died instantly. A French officer sitting next to Bernadotte was killed accidentally. 
The assassins were members of Lehi (Lohamei Herut Israel—Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), 
better known as the Stern Gang. Its three leaders had decided a week earlier to have Bernadotte killed 
because they believed he was partial to the Arabs. One of those leaders was Yitzhak Shamir, who in 
1983 would become prime minister of Israel.1 
Bernadotte had been chosen the United Nations mediator for Palestine four months earlier in what was 
the U.N.'s first serious attempt at peacemaking in the post-World War II world. As a hero of the war, 
when his mediation efforts on behalf of the International Red Cross saved 20,000 persons, including 
thousands of Jews, from Nazi concentration camps, Bernadotte seemed a natural choice for the post.2 
The terms of the mediator's mandate were to "promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in 
Palestine" and to allow him to mediate beyond the terms of the Partition Plan.3 
It had been only on Nov. 29, 1947 that the U.N. General Assembly had voted to partition Palestine 
into Arab and Jewish states. Yet, as had been widely predicted, that action had led to war. Fighting 
intensified after elements of five Arab armies moved into Palestine the day after Israel proclaimed its 
establishment on May 14, 1948. Bernadotte's first action had been to arrange a truce, which lasted 
from June 11 to July 9. 
During the lull, Bernadotte had put forward his first proposal for solving the conflict. Instead, it was to 
seal his fate. Bernadotte's transgression, in the view of Jewish zealots, was to include in his June 28 
proposal the suggestion that Jerusalem be placed under Jordanian rule, since all the area around the 
city was designated for the Arab state.4 
The U.N. partition plan had declared Jerusalem an international city that was to be ruled by neither 
Arab nor Jew. But the Jewish terrorists, including Shamir and Menachem Begin, the leader of the 
largest terrorist group, Irgun Zvai Leumi—National Military Organization, also known by the Hebrew 
acronym "Etzel"—had rejected partition and claimed all of Palestine and Jordan for the Jewish state. 
These Jewish extremists were horrified at Bernadotte's suggestion. 
By July Sternists were already threatening Bernadotte's assassination. New York Times columnist 
C.L. Sulzberger reported meeting with two Stern members on July 24, who stated: "We intend to kill 
Bernadotte and any other uniformed United Nations observers who come to Jerusalem." Asked why, 
"They replied that their organization was determined to seize all of Jerusalem for the state of Israel and 
would brook no interference by any national or international body."5 
Since Bernadotte's first set of proposals had caused criticism from all parties, he spent the rest of the 
summer working up new proposals, which he finally finished on Sept. 16. Unknown publicly was the 
fact that in his new suggestions Bernadotte dropped his idea of turning over Jerusalem to Jordan and 
instead reverted to the partition plan's designation of it as an international city.6 Thus when Shamir's 
gunmen cut down Bernadotte the next day, they were unaware that he no longer was advocating 
giving Jerusalem to the Arabs. 
The assassination brought an official condemnation from the Israeli government and promises of quick 
arrests. However, no one was ever brought to trial nor was there any nationwide outcry against the 
assassination.7 None of Lehi's leaders or the actual gunmen were ever caught, although they were 
early known to Israel's leaders.8 
Israel's obvious reluctance to prosecute the assassins brought the first U.N. Security Council criticism 
of the new country. On Oct. 19, 1948, the council unanimously passed a resolution expressing its 
"concern" that Israel had "to date submitted no report to the Security Council or the Acting Mediator 
regarding the progress of the investigation into the assassination."9 An official inquiry by Sweden 
produced a report in 1950 that charged Israel's investigation had been so negligent that "doubt must 
exist as to whether the Israeli authorities really tried to bring the inquiry to a positive result." 10 
Israel later admitted the laxity of its investigation and in 1950 paid the United Nations $54,628 in 
indemnity for Bernadotte's murder.11 
The assassination and Israel's failure to punish the culprits struck a hard blow against the fledgling 
United Nations. The first secretary-general, Trygve Lie, said: "If the Great Powers accepted that this 
situation in the Middle East could best be settled by leaving the forces concerned to fight it out 
amongst themselves, it was quite clear that they would be tacitly admitting that the Security Council 
and the United Nations was a useless instrument in attempting to preserve peace."12 To Secretary of 
State George Marshall, Lie had written on May 15, 1948 that Egypt had warned him it was about to 
send troops beyond its borders and against the Jewish state in Palestine, saying: "My primary concern 
is for the future usefulness of the United Nations and its Security Council...I must do everything to 
prevent this, otherwise the Security Council will have...created a precedent for any nation to take 
aggressive action in direct contravention to the Charter of the United Nations." 13 
But, as author Kati Marton has observed: "If the United Nations spoke with 'considerable authority' 
early that summer, by fall its voice was barely above a whisper in Palestine. Unwilling or unable to 
enforce its own decisions, the U.N. [United Nations Organization, as it was generally called in 1948] 
became for many Israelis in Ben- Gurion's memorable putdown, 'UNO, schmuno.'" She also observed: 
"So muted was the world body's reaction, so lacking in any real sanctions against the Jewish state for 
its failure to pursue the murderers of the United Nations' mediator, that for Israel, 'world opinion' 
became an empty phrase."14 
Indeed, the ideal of the U.N. acting as the world's peacemaker and peacekeeper was badly wounded 
with Bernadotte's death in Jerusalem. After this display of weakness, other nations did not hesitate to 
thumb their noses at the U.N. when it suited their purposes. The Serbian successor to the former 
Yugoslavian government is only the latest in a long list of countries that have contributed to the 
weakening of the world body that celebrates its 50th anniversary this year. 
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Uniting for Peace General Assembly resolution 377 (V), By Christian Tomuschat 
On 3 November 1950, the General Assembly adopted resolution 377 A (V), which was given the title 
“Uniting for Peace”. The adoption of this resolution came as a response to the strategy of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to block any determination by the Security Council on measures to 
be taken in order to protect the Republic of Korea against the aggression launched against it by 
military forces from North Korea. General view of the General Assembly Hall in Flushing MeadowAt 
the initial stage of this armed conflict, in June 1950, the Security Council had been able to recommend 
to the Members of the United Nations to “furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be 
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area” 
(resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950). The resolution could be passed because the USSR, at that 
time, boycotted the meetings of the Security Council with the aim of obtaining the allocation of the 
permanent Chinese seat to the communist Government in Beijing. It assumed that in its absence the 
Security Council would not be able to discharge its functions since Article 27, paragraph 3, of the 
Charter provides that substantive resolutions of the Security Council require an affirmative vote of 
nine members “including the concurring votes of the permanent members”. The majority of the 
members of the Security Council, however, were of the view that absence from the meeting room 
could not prevent the key organ of the United Nations from acting validly, a view that was later 
endorsed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1971, p. 16, at para. 22). Given that its 
protests remained fruitless, the USSR sent again, as from August 1950, a delegation to the meetings of 
the Council which cast a negative vote on a United States draft resolution condemning the continued 
defiance of the United Nations by the North Korean authorities. In order to overcome this impasse, the 
United States, under the leadership of its Foreign Secretary Dean Acheson, succeeded in persuading 
the General Assembly that it should claim for itself a subsidiary responsibility with regard to 
international peace and security, as enunciated by Article 14 of the Charter. The result of these efforts 
was resolution 377 A (V). 
The most important part of resolution 377 A (V) is section A which states that where the Security 
Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly shall 
seize itself of the matter. Procedural and substantive steps are suggested. First of all, if the Assembly is 
not in session, it may meet in emergency special session at the request of the Security Council or of a 
majority of its own members. Second, such a session shall be convened with a view to making 
appropriate recommendations for “collective measures…including the use of armed force when 
necessary”. As also the language of the resolution clearly reveals, the General Assembly can never be 
a full substitute for the Security Council in this area. Accordingly, only “recommendations” are 
mentioned, i.e., pronouncements devoid of any binding legal force. Additionally, resolution 377 A (V) 
establishes two auxiliary bodies, a Peace Observation Commission, which existed until 1960, and a 
Collective Measures Committee, which had a short life of only two years. None of these bodies has 
played any role of major significance. 
Although the General Assembly did not attempt to arrogate to itself powers akin to those rooted in 
Chapter VII of the Charter, it stands to reason that originally resolution 377 A (V) was hardly 
reconcilable with the Charter. Articles 11 and 12 establish unequivocally the primacy of the Security 
Council with regard to all matters relating to international peace and security. As far as procedure is 
concerned, Article 12, paragraph 1, stipulates that while the Council is exercising its function in 
respect of any dispute or situation, “the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with 
regard to that dispute or situation”. On the other hand, where “action” seems to be necessary, the 
General Assembly is enjoined to refer the matter to the Council (Article 11, paragraph 2). This 
configuration, however, was hard to uphold. Politically, it is definitely quite unwise to keep the 
General Assembly on the sidelines when a major conflict erupts. Almost as a logical consequence, 
Article 11, paragraph 2, and Article 12, paragraph 1, have suffered an erosion process of which 
resolution 377 A (V) constitutes only one element among many others. In its Advisory Opinion on the 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ has 
formally confirmed that the prohibition of simultaneous action has been superseded by practice (I.C.J. 
Reports 2004, p. 136, at paras. 27-28). 
To date, ten emergency special sessions have been convened. The first one took place on the occasion 
of the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt and the British-French attack on the Suez Canal zone; the 
tenth emergency special session, dealing with the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, started in 
1997 and has not yet come to its end. (It was adjourned by resolution ES-10/16 of 17 November 2006, 
para. 13, and can at any time be resumed upon request by Member States.) 
According to political criteria, different patterns can be distinguished. If the Security Council is 
unanimous in requesting such a session, the harmony between the two main organs of the United 
Nations is not disturbed. The crisis in Lebanon prompted the Security Council in 1958 to convene an 
emergency special session of the General Assembly (resolution 129 (1958) of 7 August 1958). It did 
so without mentioning explicitly resolution 377 A (V), and one may indeed have doubts as to whether 
this was a case of application of that resolution since there was no lack of unanimity of the permanent 
members. The situation in Lebanon was referred to the General Assembly because the Security 
Council had no solution to offer. The second situation is characterized by a vote of a majority of the 
members of the Security Council against the opposition of some other members, including permanent 
members. In such instances, the veto does not operate since referral to the General Assembly is 
considered to constitute a procedural determination and hence not subject to such blocking power. 
Understandably, the first emergency special session was called by the Security Council against the 
resistance of France and the United Kingdom (resolution 119 (1956) of 31 October 1956). In the 
Hungarian crisis, which unfolded almost at the same time, the roles were distributed differently, with 
only the USSR opposing the motion (resolution 120 (1956) of 4 November 1956). Similar 
configurations could be observed with regard to the holding of emergency special sessions on the 
Republic of the Congo (resolution 157 (1960) of 17 September 1960: opposition of Poland and the 
USSR), on the conflict between India and Pakistan on account of East Pakistan/Bangladesh (resolution 
303 (1971) of 6 December 1971: abstention of France, Poland, the USSR and the United Kingdom), 
and on Afghanistan (resolution 462 (1980) of 9 January 1980: opposition of the German Democratic 
Republic and the USSR). Total emancipation from the Security Council is reached where the 
Secretary-General convenes an emergency special meeting at the request of a United Nations Member 
acting with the support of a majority in the General Assembly. The seventh emergency special session 
on Palestine (1980-1982) was in fact initiated by Senegal, the eighth emergency special session on 
Namibia (1981) goes back to a request by Zimbabwe, and the tenth emergency special session was 
solicited by Qatar as the Chair of the Group of Arab States at the United Nations. It stands to reason 
that in such instances the overwhelming weight of third world countries can manifest itself to its full 
extent. Urgent matters may also be dealt with during the ordinary sessions of the General Assembly if 
the Security Council takes no action owing to the negative vote of a permanent member. (A prominent 
example is provided by General Assembly resolution 41/38 of 20 November 1986, dealing with the 
aerial and naval attack on Libya by the United States.) 
Although the shifting of responsibilities to the General Assembly may not be consistent with the 
original intentions of the drafters of the Charter, it is today fully accepted that emergency special 
sessions have become an integral part of the legal order of the United Nations. On the other hand, the 
need for the holding of such sessions has considerably decreased, as for many years the General 
Assembly is frequently in session much beyond the usual period from September to December. On a 
regular basis sessions are resumed in plenary meetings for short periods in the months before the start 
of a new session in September. In the early years, Member States were not represented in New York 
throughout the year. Today, urgent matters can be dealt with by the General Assembly at short notice. 
As already pointed out, the tenth emergency special session, which started in 1997, has not yet been 
concluded and has for many years operated alongside the regular sessions of the General Assembly. 
(In its Advisory Opinion on the Wall case (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 152, at para. 34), the ICJ did not 
raise any objections against that practice.) It has become a special forum to deliberate on the policies 
and practices of Israel with regard to the occupied Palestinian territories, totally changing its character 
from a meeting convened to discuss urgent matters to a permanent, but intermittent conference on a 
topic of paramount interest to the international community. 
Obviously, the crucial element of resolution 377 A (V) was the affirmation that the General Assembly 
may, if deemed appropriate by it, recommend collective action, including the use of force. In this core 
sense, the resolution has been implemented only once in the Korean crisis. By resolution 498 (V) of 1 
February 1951 it made a finding to the effect that the People’s Republic of China had engaged in 
aggression in Korea (para. 1) and “call[ed] upon all States and authorities to continue to lend every 
assistance to the United Nations action in Korea” (para. 4), which of course meant military assistance. 
The resolution does not explicitly refer to the Uniting for Peace resolution, but it emphasizes that the 
Security Council, “because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (preamble). Thus, the 
wording is exactly copied from resolution 377 A (V). The establishment of the peacekeeping operation 
First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) by resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 with 
a view to monitoring the frontline between Israel and Egypt does not come within the same category 
since UNEF I had no combat function to discharge but was meant to neutralize the conflict solely by 
its presence between the two opposing parties in accordance with the “classic” peacekeeping concept 
which was given birth on that occasion. On the whole, it is not easy to draw the demarcation line 
between “measures” contemplated specifically by resolution 377 A (V) and other measures which the 
General Assembly may recommend within the framework of its general mandate without any 
hindrance. According to the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the Certain Expenses case, the exclusive 
powers of the Security Council are confined to coercive or enforcement action (Certain Expenses of 
the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. 
Reports 1962, p. 151, at 164), but the ICJ did not discuss specifically the impact of resolution 377 A 
(V). In this connection, the question arises, inter alia, how the imposition of an embargo, as formerly 
practiced by the General Assembly in a sustained fashion to the detriment of South Africa, is to be 
characterized (this practice commenced with resolution 41/35 F of 10 November 1986). In any event, 
it has become a regular feature of resolutions of the General Assembly with regard to armed conflicts 
to call upon the parties to desist from any hostilities and to withdraw their troops to their own 
territories (see, for instance, resolution 62/243 of 14 March 2008, on the situation in the occupied 
territories of Azerbaijan). Such requests are not considered as requiring any particular legitimation 
under resolution 377 A (V). 
Resolution 377 A (V) has a potential that could subvert the well-equilibrated balance of power within 
the United Nations, a potential that is not disclosed in a recent description of the role and authority of 
the General Assembly (see resolution 60/286 of 8 September 2006, annex, para. 1). But it would 
actually be used against the Security Council only in case of general dissatisfaction with the policies of 
the permanent members. Notwithstanding their sheer numerical superiority, the many Members of the 
United Nations are much too weak to attempt to challenge the decisions made at the Security Council. 
Any application of Uniting for Peace with a view to taking enforcement action would at least need the 
support of one of the permanent members. To date, resolution 498 (V) of 1951 remains the only 
example of a situation where the General Assembly, at that time under dominating Western influence, 
recommended taking such action, notwithstanding the firm resistance of a permanent member. 
